Pakistan and Nuclear Security
Pakistan is increasingly facing instability on many fronts, including its poor economic situation, political instability, and a degenerating security environment. American experts have long been concerned with the country’s nuclear weapons program due to Pakistan’s significant terrorist presence. Recent events should be moving this concern to the top of American policymakers’ agendas. What are the likely effects of recent crises on nuclear security, and what can the United States do about it?
The most significant problem affecting Pakistan’s nuclear security is the increasing number of terrorist attacks in the country. Several major suicide bombings have occurred so far this year, as well as attacks on security forces in western regions near the Afghan border. Relations with the Taliban regime have worsened as Pakistan believes it has allowed militants safe haven, with a porous border between the countries making it difficult to control terrorist movements. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 2021, many Pakistani Taliban fighters (a related group) were able to leave prisons and gain access to abandoned American weapons. Pakistan has announced plans to deport Afghan refugees in the country, of which there are likely over 2 million. These migrants are increasingly viewed as an economic burden by Pakistanis, but a massive deportation program could easily create chaos in the region.
Terrorists gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is currently not a likely scenario but cannot be ruled out entirely. Pakistan faces concurrent economic and political difficulties that put the stability of its governance into question. The country is experiencing high inflation, a rise in poverty, and a growing debt-to-GDP ratio now at 76 percent. Last year, devastating floods left 2 million people homeless and caused $15 billion in damages. (Pakistan’s climate change minister claimed that a third of the country’s territory was flooded, though this was later contested by other sources.)
Politically, an interim government is in place, though the next election’s timing is uncertain as electoral boundaries need to be drawn. Former PM Imran Khan continues to challenge the government and military, despite facing dozens of court cases and being arrested twice this year. Khan was sentenced to three years in prison on corruption charges and banned from holding office for five, but this sentence was suspended in August. Khan has many supporters and claims he is being persecuted for political reasons: his arrest in May resulted in serious riots and attacks on military facilities.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence services are quite powerful politically, and the military has always dominated the making of nuclear policy and strategy. Pakistani officials have consistently denied the idea of any deficiencies in its nuclear weapons’ safety and security. Although its weapons are stored disassembled (in parts), its development of tactical (i.e., battlefield) nuclear weapons has alarmed recent presidential administrations as they are seen as more susceptible to theft. Information on Pakistan’s nuclear force structure is difficult to verify as official sources are opaque. However, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates an arsenal of about 170 warheads, which is likely expanding, with new delivery systems in development and a growing capacity to enrich fissile material. New delivery systems would be in addition to missiles of various ranges, air-delivered bombs, and sea-launched cruise missiles. The country’s nuclear strategy is almost entirely focused on deterrence against India: former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has claimed that the two countries came dangerously close to a nuclear conflict in 2019, with U.S. involvement preventing further escalation following a sequence of mutual attacks. This example shows the critical role that the United States must play in stabilizing Pakistan and its regional relations.
The present situation in Pakistan is worrying, with significant security, economic, and political challenges all compounding each other. American policymakers should work to assist Pakistan with these problems in the interest of South Asian security and stability. The United States can advocate for Pakistan in its future negotiations with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) over loan obligations and debt. The U.S. could also advocate greater foreign direct investment into Pakistan and possibly encourage greater trade with India, though this could be challenging due to the tense history of Indo-Pakistani relations.
Although the political situation is trickier to address, the U.S. can privately discuss with the Pakistanis the importance of the rule of law and democratic accountability. Moves by the intelligence services to set up parallel courts and harsh judicial punishments should be discouraged, and the political struggle with Imran Khan could lose momentum with increased transparency from the government and legal system. If pending cases against him are indeed politically motivated, they should not be pursued. Public naming and shaming against corrupt officials or judges could also have a positive effect.
Finally, the United States should consider more security assistance and aid to Pakistan. The country was a key partner in the War on Terror period, and the U.S. helped to improve the security environment. After Afghanistan, it would be politically difficult to advocate for greater involvement in the region. However, an independent effort by the Pakistani government to curb attacks has a low probability of success. Because further violence can easily trigger a downward spiral in the security situation, a future security initiative should at least be considered. An integrated effort combining economic, political, and security measures would alleviate many of Pakistan’s factors that are driving current instability. Any prospect of an effect on Pakistan’s nuclear security must be avoided.
