China and Nuclear Deterrence
A debate has been swirling in Washington about the proper response to China’s growing nuclear weapons arsenal. Prominent leaders in the nuclear strategy field, such as retired official Franklin Miller and a group of experts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, are arguing for a significant increase in the United States deployed nuclear force. However, other voices contend that the benefits of an increase are unclear or that expansion would be counterproductive. A Congressional “Strategic Posture Commission” has released its own analysis on the deterrence challenge posed by China, calling for new and expanded defense programs.
Certain facts are acknowledged by all sides: China is expanding and modernizing its nuclear force and capabilities. Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world and has also been modernizing. Relations with both states have worsened, and the global security environment is increasingly unstable and challenging for the United States. Although the U.S. is replacing its triad systems and warheads, this is generally seen as a bare minimum necessity to ensure deterrence at a continued baseline level. However, how the U.S. should interpret these challenges and respond is a vitally important policy choice where views vary significantly.
U.S. nuclear force structure is a multifaceted issue that goes beyond the scope of a single blog post. I would like to focus here on the basic size issue, as well as what challenges or scenarios the United States should be prepared for.
Focusing on size is important as it is a basic attribute of the nuclear force that naturally leads to decisions as to its composition, delivery systems, and targeting strategy. An inevitable consideration for increasing the size of the nuclear arsenal is that it would likely lead to a three-way arms race (with Russia and China) with no easy way out. It is likely for this reason that President Biden’s National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has clearly stated that “the United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them” as some have suggested.
Since current prospects for arms control with either Russia or China are quite poor, how could a potential arms race be avoided? The Congressional commission argues that the U.S. can use its “instruments of national power including its strong economic, political and defense capabilities,” to make Russia and China cease and desist arms racing, having been convinced that they cannot gain an advantage by doing so. This recommended action is quite vague and unpersuasive. We can develop and improve our military capabilities while preventing potential adversaries from doing the same by sheer intimidation? An effort to intimidate can easily fail, with reactions outside of our control. In fact, we could provoke even greater increases in Russia or China’s arsenals.
The size of our arsenal should not depend on adversary arsenals or the potential number of targets that we could strike. As others have argued, the United States arsenal already has massive destructive potential, much of which is survivable against an attempted preemptive or “out-of-the-blue” strike by an enemy. The United States nuclear force simply needs to have the potential to inflict enough damage on an enemy’s society or infrastructure to deter attack. If the likely cost is high enough, neither Russia nor China will use its nuclear forces even if they have larger arsenals. The relative size of forces is irrelevant as long as enough damage potential is retained.
I will now examine which national security threats the United States should focus on to determine policy on its nuclear arsenal.
Proponents of nuclear expansion are often raising a supposed necessary ability for the U.S. to defeat a coordinated attack by Russia and China. The idea of the United States fighting a simultaneous nuclear war against both Russia and China should be incredibly alarming for Americans. Somehow, the Livermore group states that it is not making “worst-case” assumptions in its planning and recommendations. What could be worse than a global nuclear war? Let’s call this what it would be: World War III.
The Congressional report even states that dismissing this possibility as improbable (which most rational people would do), and not preparing for it strategically, could make it more likely: “China, Russia, or both simultaneously, may believe that the United States and its Allies are unlikely to oppose their regional aggression with sufficient forces to guarantee victory, since doing so may leave the United States and its Allies vulnerable in another theater.”
First of all, the United States cannot control Russia or China’s beliefs or assumptions. How would one define a level of “sufficient forces”? What number of forces would be considered “vulnerable”? An amount of military force cannot “guarantee” victory by its existence alone. Preparing for unlikely scenarios is great if the scenario actually occurs. But this preparation has its own costs, which the report largely sidesteps.
At this point, the analysis of these reports has devolved to essentially imagining scenarios with a debatable relationship with reality. The language of “may” and “might” is belied by the straightforward recommendations that the United States will be forced to develop its nuclear forces and delivery systems quantitatively and qualitatively (by building new weapons such as the sea-launched cruise missile) to prepare for these scenarios, regardless of their likelihood.
The Livermore report actually makes the counterpoint that a third party would have strong incentive to avoid military action during a strategic (read: nuclear) war between others, because “emerging unscathed” would “best serve long-term interests”. It nevertheless states that the third party “might” act against U.S. interests anyway. It is incredibly foolish for any state to start a conflict and gamble that the other side will not react. Even the empires that rushed into World War I knew that their opponents would mobilize and counterattack. Russia’s leaders have been forced to reckon with its hubris and costly error in assuming it could quickly remove Ukraine’s government last year. Would Russia’s leaders really be willing to risk even larger costs in the future?
Rather than imagining a scenario where the United States would fight Russia and China at the same time, analysts should focus on what aggressive acts our government should reasonably prepare for. One is Russian aggression against other European countries. The Livermore report concedes that Russia will need “a decade or more to recover militarily” from its war in Ukraine. There are also many important differences between Ukraine and other countries, including Poland and the Baltic states.
First, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and the United States will not allow it to join as long as the war with Russia continues. The muted Western reaction (especially in Europe) to Russia’s takeover of Crimea and infiltration into the Donbas in 2014 also must have encouraged Putin in assuming that his invasion in 2022 would not face serious resistance or consequences. The Russian view of Ukraine is also unique among former Soviet states. To be clear, Ukraine is a distinct nation with its own culture, language, and history. Many Russian leaders and propagandists have denied this, including in an article by President Putin published in 2021. An independent Ukraine directly threatens Putin’s neo-imperialist vision for Russia and his desire for a sphere of influence in states seen as the “near abroad”: not truly foreign or sovereign. If Ukraine is not willing to cede authority to Russia (especially in its foreign policy), what state would be?
States such as Finland and Poland have also been ruled by Russians at times. But joining NATO is a strong deterrent for Russia, and it is harder for Russian rulers to justify invasion or subversion through the historical and cultural arguments they use for Ukraine, however skewed they are. It is easy for Western audiences to brush aside Russian propaganda, but it matters and gets Russians to generally support the war effort. It is hard to see how a further Russian invasion of Europe serves its interests or is even possible when it could not and cannot defeat Ukraine. While the United States should develop strong capabilities within NATO and act in step with our allies, further Russian aggression in Europe is not likely any time soon.
The other scenario that we should focus on in terms of deterrence and nuclear force structure is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The military and political leadership of the United States (and every incoming future presidential administration) must make a private determination of whether the United States will come to Taiwan’s aid in response to a Chinese attack. The “right” size and composition of our nuclear force depends on what we want to deter with it. It makes no sense to determine it without defining a Taiwan policy. Concern over Taiwan has rightly risen in recent years due to China’s military expansion. However, foolish and provocative U.S. actions, such as former Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in fall 2022, have not served our interests or accomplished anything constructive for Taiwan’s defense, instead leading to predictable Chinese reactions. American leaders must evaluate the risk of a war against Taiwan and prepare a defense if a policy of defense is chosen.
Reasonable people can disagree over how the United States should prepare for future conflicts and what our nuclear force structure and capabilities should look like. The reports mentioned in this post are well worth reading and their recommendations should be seriously considered by policymakers. When forming policies, officials should consider what threats are most serious and which future scenarios are most likely. The potential benefits of investments must be considered against their costs. These decisions are vitally important, and they will require serious analysis and debate from our politicians, officials, and military.
