North Korea and “Denuclearization”
How to deal with a nuclear North Korea remains one of the most intractable national security challenges facing the United States. The Biden administration is the latest to inherit the issue after President Trump engaged in unprecedented summits that unfortunately left the status quo unchanged (though North Korea suspended missile and nuclear tests for some time). While some have criticized Trump for the summits from a human rights perspective, arguing that they legitimized Kim Jong Un’s harsh dictatorship, I’d argue that the approach was worth trying. It probably had better potential than former President Obama’s euphemism of “strategic patience,” which ultimately amounted to kicking the can down the road. Bringing up human rights at a conference for what would essentially be an arms control agreement would also do nothing but antagonize the North Koreans and hurt chances of a substantive outcome.
The issue of North Korea (DPRK) pursuing nuclear weapons dates back to the 1980s. In fact, President Clinton signed an Agreed Framework with the country in 1994 that dismantled North Korea’s existing reactors and formed a consortium to finance and construct light water reactors (LWR) instead. The US agreed to provide large amounts of heavy oil to the DPRK in the interim, and both sides agreed to pursue full normalization of relations (including the US ending economic sanctions). This opportunity would have resulted in a denuclearized Korea peninsula if both parties had followed it. While both sides blamed the other for the deal’s collapse, congressional opposition from Republicans in the US delayed oil shipments and progress on the reactor projects, infuriating the DPRK. It also effectively ended prospects for an end to the sanctions and normalized relations. The Bush administration later placed the DPRK in its “Axis of Evil” and accused it of hiding a uranium enrichment program. Ultimately, political opposition within the US killed the deal and created a lack of trust in our ability to meet international commitments.
Unfortunately, subsequent administrations have continued to set the goal in dealing with North Korea as denuclearization, even though that possibility has become more and more remote. North Korea currently possesses between 30-40 weapons and has developed ICBMs capable of reaching the entire continental US. It is hard to imagine what the US could offer in exchange for giving that up, especially considering the fate of the Agreed Framework. Kim and his regime certainly desire an end to US sanctions. However, Kim sees his weapons as the only way to ensure the US will not encourage “regime change” or launch a war against him. While sanctions are damaging, Kim’s nuclear weapons in his mind ensure his nation’s security as well as his own personal safety.
In the same vein, it is difficult to see why the US must insist on denuclearization. While relying on the logic of mutually assured destruction is not comforting, nothing about its logic changes in the current situation as opposed to the Cold War. If North Korea ever actually attacked the United States, it would be suicidal. This fact should be foremost in policymakers’ minds, despite attempts in the media to paint Kim as “irrational”. In fact, while the rhetoric can be aggressive, we have seen nothing but rational actions by Kim and his regime. Even his acquisition of the nuclear weapons has come at remarkably little cost. A far more practical and achievable goal in dealing with the DRPK would be an arms control agreement. Instead of the present uncontrolled situation, the US could offer an end to sanctions in return for a cap on North Korea’s weapons. This would also be a confidence building measure that would increase trust and decrease tensions between our countries. After all, denuclearization efforts have been pursued for a generation with no tangible results: it is time to try a new strategy.
